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The rise of Syriza and Podemos alongside debates amongst Egyptian and other socialists about participation in parliamentary elections has reignited considerable interest across the international left about the issue of parliamentary elections. It is hard to imagine a more apt moment for the publication of August Nimtz’s study of Lenin’s practical and theoretical engagement with this subject. While praising Nimtz’s scholarship, this essay challenges his interpretation of the relationship between strategy and tactics in Lenin’s thought and the position of elections therein. It concludes with an attempt to unpick what is of general significance in Lenin’s engagement with electoral politics from more local details of interest only to scholars of Russian history.
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Recent social and political movements in Egypt, Greece, Spain and elsewhere have reignited a debate that has been live on the revolutionary left since the 1840s - how, and indeed if, revolutionary socialists should engage in parliamentary elections.​[1]​ August Nimtz’s two-volume history of Bolshevik electoral practice, Lenin’s Electoral Strategy,​[2]​ is perhaps best understood as a contribution to this debate through the lens of a reconstruction of what he calls the “only example of a revolutionary movement employing the electoral/parliamentary arena to lead the working class to state power”.​[3]​ 
Nimtz’s study of Lenin builds upon his two previous works on Marx and Engels’ politics: Marx and Engels: Their Contribution to the Democratic Breakthrough; and Marx, Tocqueville, and Race in America. The first of these books, which was strongly influenced by the work of Hal Draper, Ian Hunt and Alan Gilbert, powerfully extended Dietrich Rueschemeyer et al’s thesis that “the organized working class appeared as a key actor in the development of full democracy almost everywhere” from the second half of the nineteenth-century onwards.​[4]​ Complementing the findings of this study, Nimtz detailed how Marx and Engels played an “indispensible” role in the process of working-class self-organisation in this formative period.​[5]​ Marx, Tocqueville, and Race in America expanded one aspect of this thesis into a full length study of the relationship between democracy and racism in America. Nimtz argued that Marx and Engels’ had a much more sophisticated understanding of the limitations of American democracy than did Tocqueville because they understood what he did not: that racism in America was not merely a function of local “mores” but was in fact rooted in the “exploitation of labour” such that “the overthrow of slavery and racial oppression were central to” the realisation of real democracy.​[6]​
This profoundly democratic interpretation of Marx and Engels’s thought is the solid foundation upon which Nimtz’s sets about exploding some myths about Lenin’s political practice. By means of a critique of the widespread but thoroughly misleading caricature of Lenin’s politics as a kind of insurrectionary other to (German) social democratic participation in parliamentary elections,​[7]​ Nimtz argues not only that revolutionaries had a considerable degree of influence on Russian parliamentary elections in the decade or so leading up to 1917, but also that this electoral activity played a significant part in the broader revolutionary process over this period. Nimtz rightly suggests that this history is important not because tactical questions in Greece, Egypt and elsewhere can be read directly from the history of the Bolshevik Party, but rather because Lenin deepened insights from Marx and Engels into a general method by which revolutionary socialists might frame their participation in parliamentary elections without succumbing to the self-defeating logic of reformism. 
In effect, Nimtz’s reconstruction of Lenin’s revolutionary approach to electoral work is an attempt to detail one aspect of the latter’s claim that “‘the concrete analysis of the concrete situation is not an opposite of “pure” theory, but – on the contrary – it is the culmination of genuine theory, its consummation – the point where it breaks into practice’”.​[8]​ To this end, Nimtz aims not merely to detail Bolshevik electoral practice but more importantly to illuminate its theoretical underpinnings.​[9]​ And like Lars Lih’s much celebrated Lenin Rediscovered, Nimtz’s Lenin’s Electoral Strategy marks an attempt to unpick the real Lenin from myths about his theory and practice.​[10]​ However, by contrast with Lih’s ongoing attempt to reduce Lenin’s Marxism to a Russian variant of Kautskyism,​[11]​ Nimtz insists that the roots of Lenin’s break with Kautsky in 1914 can be traced back to developing differences between the two men over the previous two decades. This fundamental insight is rooted in a key strength of Nimtz’s book as compared with Lih’s: its explicit political orientation. Whereas Lih’s initial goal was simply to correct what he believed to be an erroneous interpretation of Lenin’s best known work, Nimtz is much more overt about his political message: his intention is to mine what he calls Lenin’s “Revolutionary Parliametarianism” for insights relevant to modern politics.​[12]​ 
Nimtz’s study opens with an overview of Marx and Engels’s approach to parliamentary elections before making the perceptive point, contra Lih’s one-sided claims about Lenin’s relationship to Kautsky, that in developing his strategic and tactical thinking “Lenin drew almost exclusively on Marx and Engels and not subsequent recruits to their program such as Kautsky and Plekhanov”.​[13]​ Nimtz argues that, for the founders of Marxism, participation in parliamentary elections “was obligatory”.​[14]​ And whereas, in 1848, Marx advocated voting for the liberal bourgeoisie because he believed the workers’ movement was not yet strong enough to act as a viable alternative to it, within a year he began to call for what would be his political leitmotif: “complete working-class political independence from liberal democrats”.​[15]​ Nimtz also points out that though Marx did not confuse this demand for political independence with a refusal to form alliances with “petit bourgeois democracy”, he remained adamant that such alliances should be alliances and “not unity”.​[16]​ More to the point, “[f]or Marx and Engels electoral victories were subordinate to independent working-class political action”.​[17]​ 
So while Marx was keen to attack the “parliamentary cretinism” of those who reified parliamentary elections as the instrument of radical change,​[18]​ he and Engels were also critical of those anarchists who refused to participate in such elections for fear of dirtying their hands in the cesspit of parliament.​[19]​ As against anarchist criticisms of his approach, Marx was clear that parliament was not an end in itself but a means to an end: it was “a platform ... for our principles”. Similarly, Engels conceived universal suffrage not as a simple means to liberation but as a “gauge of the maturity of the working class”.​[20]​ And despite Marx’s famous comments about the possibility of non-violent transitions to socialism in England and America, Engels famously pointed out that Marx “never forgot to add that he hardly expected the English ruling classes to submit, without a ‘pro-slavery rebellion’, to this peaceful and legal revolution”.​[21]​  
With regard to Marx and Engels’s view of parliamentary practice, Nimtz highlights the claim made in their 1879 Circular Letter to leading German social democrats that challenges to what critics called the “one-sidedly” working-class character of the party were not merely opportunistic but more importantly represented the malign influence on the party of “representatives of the petty bourgeoisie”.​[22]​ In fact, Nimtz interprets the Circular Letter as an extension of Marx and Engels’s earlier concerns about the “pernicious effects of liberalism on the workers’ movement” into a “major programmatic statement against opportunism or what would later be called reformism or revisionism”.​[23]​ In essence, Marx and Engels’s position was, according to Nimtz, for electoral participation of a specific kind: one which recognised that “electoral victories were subordinate to independent working-class political action”.​[24]​ This approach was intended to immunise the left against the “parliamentary disease” of “opportunism”: a condition characterised by Engels as “[t]he forgetting of the great, the principal considerations for the momentary interests of the day”. Engels continued on to argue that “this struggling and striving for the success of the moment regardless of later consequences, this sacrifice of the future of the movement for its present, may be “honestly” meant, but it is and remains opportunism, and “honest” opportunism is perhaps the most dangerous of all!”​[25]​ According to Nimtz, this perspective framed Lenin’s engagement with parliamentary work. 
Nimtz’s discussion of Lenin’s approach to parliamentary elections opens with an overview of his response to the tsarist regime’s proposal to set up a Duma (advisory quasi-parliament) in 1905. This proposal was made under pressure of the revolutionary movement and the first Duma was elected the following year (it was subsequently dissolved in 1907, after which there were two further Duma elections that year with a fourth election in 1912). Lenin’s initial response to the first Duma election was to insist that the question of participation was tactical rather than strategic in nature: “participation”, as Nimtz points out, “depended on the political context and, most important on whether it offered opportunities to advance the revolutionary process”.​[26]​ Concretely, with Russia on the cusp of revolution and the first Duma an undemocratic sham, Lenin concluded that the Bolsheviks should boycott it: “The Duma is to serve as a plaster to draw the heat out of the revolution”.​[27]​ Nonetheless, he insisted that the boycott should be an “active” rather than a passive project: “taking advantage of election meetings, even if we have to force our way into them, holding demonstrations, political strikes, and so on and so forth”.​[28]​
Whatever the merits of the concept of an active boycott, the assumption underpinning Lenin’s initial support of the boycott was that revolution was on the immediate agenda. Subsequently, as Lenin came to realise both that the revolutionary wave was on the ebb and, what is of more general significance, that the concept of an active boycott made little practical sense; he concluded that his original arguments for a boycott were mistaken.​[29]​ This is an important point, and Nimtz is undoubtedly right to emphasise it. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that as late as 1919 Lenin could write to Sylvia Pankhurst that her refusal to participate in parliamentary elections should not be a barrier to joining the fledgling Communist Party: in the heat of revolutionary ferment across Europe he believed that though Communists should ideally participate in elections this was a “secondary question”.​[30]​ 
In fact, it was only as the European revolutionary tide began to wane after 1919 that Lenin became much more insistent on the importance of Communist participation in parliamentary elections. Similarly, a decade earlier he firmly fought for a break with his earlier (mistaken) support for a boycott of the Duma elections as he recognised that revolution was no longer on the agenda in Russia. If this initially put him in a minority position within the Bolshevik faction where his stance was widely ridiculed,​[31]​ he eventually won the group over to participation through a struggle against his left-wing critics (led by Alexander Bogdanov) in 1907. Lenin argued that his opponents amongst the Bolsheviks “failed to appreciate that differing forms of struggle were appropriate at different times”.​[32]​ A decade later he justified his revised position in the essay “On Compromises”:

“Compromises are often unavoidably forced upon a fighting party by circumstances ... The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to declare that it is impossible to renounce all compromises, but to be able, through all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of paving the way for revolution and educating the mass of the people for victory in the revolution. To agree ... to participate in the third and fourth Dumas was a compromise, a temporary renunciation of revolutionary demands. But this was a compromise absolutely forced upon us, for the balance of forces made it impossible for us for the time being to conduct a mass revolutionary struggle, and in order to prepare this struggle over a long period we had to be able to work even from inside such a “pigsty”. History has proved that this approach to the question by the Bolsheviks as a party was perfectly correct.”​[33]​

Within the Duma, Lenin argued that Social Democratic deputies should “render the cause of the working-class movement and of the revolution a great service by [their] bold and consistent utterance, by proclaiming with unmistakable clarity the demands and slogans of consistent democracy and the proletarian class struggle for socialism”.​[34]​ Furthermore, he insisted that “we send deputies into bourgeois and bourgeois-Black-Hundred representative institutions not for diplomacy, but for a special type of subsidiary party work, for agitation and propaganda from a particular rostrum”. Their job, contra the role we’ve come to expect of social democratic deputies in the West over the past century or so, was not to act as “a general staff ... but rather [as] a unit of trumpeters in one case, or a reconnaissance unit in another, or an organisation of some other auxiliary ‘arm’”.​[35]​ On a more mundane note, he dismissed criticisms that, by pledging an oath of fealty to the tsar, these deputies were effectively reneging on their revolutionary aspirations: revolutionary work in the Duma was too important to be sacrificed at the altar of a pseudo-radical refusal to submit to parliamentary protocols. And despite his support for a boycott of the first Duma, Lenin embraced those deputies who had stood as social democrats in those elections, and attempted to influence them so that they might contribute positively to the workers’ movement.​[36]​ 
One core aspect of Lenin’s approach to electoral politics that Nimtz rightly emphasises was his opposition to “lesser-evilism”: the standpoint, accepted by the Mensheviks, that social democrats should support the liberals as the lesser evil against more right-wing forces. Here, as Nimtz points out, Lenin developed an argument of general significance that followed Marx and Engels’s attempts to foster independent working-class political organisation.​[37]​ This question was posed most starkly in relation to the issue of whether or not to stand socialist candidates in elections dominated by the contest between the liberal Cadet party on the one side and the proto-fascist Black-Hundreds on the other. Against Menshevik arguments for supporting the liberals, Lenin argued that the liberals were in fact apologists for the tsar, “the known leader of the Black Hundreds”, that a vote for the liberals would mean “tacitly surrender[ing] hegemony in the democratic struggle to the Cadets” and, perhaps most importantly, the Mensheviks’ standpoint assumed an “inaccurate appraisal of the Duma and its role”.​[38]​ Though understandable, the Menshevik approach meant they became increasingly sucked into the logic of the parliamentary game in a way that led inextricably to the subordination of the workers’ party to the liberal bourgeoisie.​[39]​ Lenin’s alternative method meant, as Marcel Liebman put it, that while he opposed “the opportunism of the Mensheviks” this was not from an abstentionist standpoint: “Lenin was no less opposed to the tendency frequently apparent among the Bolsheviks to disregard the possibilities offered by the Duma to a party that stoutly safeguarded itself against the danger of Right-wing deviation”.​[40]​
Liebman’s comments on Lenin’s approach to electoral activity are doubly relevant to this review both because they support Nimtz’s general interpretation of Lenin’s approach to elections while simultaneously highlighting an important problem with a central claim of his book: that he has uncovered a practice that has been either suppressed or at least “largely unacknowledged” by Lenin’s interlocutors.​[41]​ Despite the similarities between Liebman’s argument  and Nimtz’s account of Lenin’s “revolutionary parliamentarianism”, Nimtz insists that his book breaks “a conspiracy of silence by both foe and friend alike” about “Lenin’s electoral strategy”.​[42]​ This claim is simply untrue. Though Nimtz’s book undoubtedly includes a much more detailed (and welcome) discussion of Lenin’s electoral work than any previous study of the subject, of the eleven secondary sources on Lenin that Nimtz claims “largely ignore” this aspect of his politics, eight actually discuss his parliamentary work in terms broadly consistent with Nimtz’s own account.​[43]​ This point is not merely of academic significance, for Nimtz’s claim about the novelty of his thesis actually obscures the complementarities between his detailed reconstruction of Lenin’s electoral work and the most powerful interpretations of his thought penned by authors such as Tony Cliff, Neil Harding, Paul LeBlanc, Lars Lih, Marcel Liebman and most recently Tamás Krausz. 
Nimtz’s criticisms of these writers also illuminates a significant weakness with his analysis of what he calls Lenin’s “electoral strategy”. Despite providing a rich description of Lenin’s practice, he fails to outline a consistent account either of Lenin’s general understanding of the relationship between strategy and tactics in Marxist political theory or of his specific conceptualisation of the place of electoral work within his broader political perspective. In fact, throughout the two volumes of his book Nimtz consistently confuses the concepts of strategy and tactics. Thus he simultaneously claims that Lenin embraced what he calls a “strategy of revolutionary parliamentarianism” in which his engagement with parliamentary elections was “at the center of his politics”,​[44]​ while conversely suggesting that participation in elections was for Lenin a “tactic” that “depended on the political context”.​[45]​ Similarly, though he claims that “what takes place outside the parliamentary arena is decisive in politics” he also writes both that “the electoral/parliamentary politics was as central to Lenin’s project as anything else” and that “his electoral/parliamentary strategy was decisive in the Bolshevik-led triumph in 1917”.​[46]​ 
In regard to the detail of this final claim, Alexander Rabinowitch is undoubtedly right to counter, in his reply to an e-mail query from Nimtz, that Nimtz’s “hypothesis regarding the importance of elections to Lenin seems completely implausible”.​[47]​ This rejoinder should not be interpreted as suggesting that electoral activity was unimportant to the Bolsheviks’s struggle for power, but rather that Nimtz has overstated its importance in an attempt to bend the stick against an anti-parliamentary ultra-leftism that is, at least amongst the writers he criticises, largely a figment of his own imagination. 
To judge the relative importance of the parliamentary tactic it is essential to theorise its relationship to the broader revolutionary movement in terms of the movement from strategy to tactics through a “concrete analysis of a concrete situation”. But Nimtz neither defines the concepts of strategy and tactics nor the relationship between them. Consequently, he doesn’t furnish us with the necessary tools to realise such a project. 
This is an important failing because, as Toni Negri has argued, “the relationship between strategy and tactics ... seems the most distinctive element in Lenin’s thought”.​[48]​ Conceptualising this relationship is thus of the first importance to any account of Lenin’s politics. Interestingly in this regard, alongside Lenin’s famous return to Hegel as he sought to make sense of the collapse of the Second International in 1914, he also read Clausewitz. And while his primary aim when reading Clausewitz was to make sense of the limitations of Second International analyses of the First World War, a number of commentators have argued that On War influenced not merely Lenin’s understanding of military matters. Thus Jacob Kipp argues that in 1915 “Lenin presents his paradigm shift in the form of intellectual synthesis of Clausewitz, Hegel, Marx, and Engels, transforming the dialectic from an external process of ‘copying’ observed empirical phenomena into an internalized tool for the unification of theory and practice”.​[49]​  
Unfortunately, Kipp is in a minority amongst Lenin’s interlocutors - who have tended to under-emphasise the importance of Clausewitz to his understanding of method. While this lacuna is understandable enough given Lenin’s much more substantial notes on Hegel, the relative sparsity of commentary on his reading of Clausewitz is not simply a matter of the relative weight of these two sets of notes: Lenin’s notes on Clausewitz have been overlooked in large part because they were omitted from his Collected Works – a decision probably not unrelated to Stalin’s 1947 decree that Clausewitz was “obsolete”.​[50]​ One consequence of this decision is that there is little on Clausewitz in Lenin’s Collected Works beyond his repetition in Socialism and War and elsewhere of Clausewitz’s fundamental claim that “war is the continuation of politics by other (namely violent) means”.​[51]​ The subsequent tendency to downplay the significance of Lenin’s interpretation of Clausewitz to broader aspects of his Marxism is unfortunate because his notebooks on Clausewitz also illuminate his ongoing attempt to grasp the relationship between strategy and tactics within Marxist politics.​[52]​ For instance, where Clausewitz claims that “[i]n political terms a defensive war is a war fought for one's own independence. Strategically, defensive war means a campaign limited to my fighting the enemy in a theater of war which I have prepared for that purpose. Whether in this theater of war I fight defensively or offensively does not make any difference”, Lenin comments “N.B. ‘A defensive war’ in politics and strategy. N.B. right!” (Lenin 1977, 214).  
Given the significance of the relationship between strategy and tactics within Clausewitz’s work it might seem obvious that his potential influence on Lenin would be a fruitful avenue for exploration, especially in a book concerned with Lenin’s strategy. Unfortunately, Nimtz’s one comment on Clausewitz illuminates his general failure to move beyond a description of Lenin’s support for parliamentary participation towards an adequate theory of this process: he simply dismisses Tony Cliff’s discussion of the relationship between strategy and tactics in Lenin’s Marxism as “16 pages with the subtitle ‘Lenin learns from Clausewitz’”.​[53]​ Thus, without even a cursory commentary on what Lenin may or may not have learnt from Clausewitz, or of what Cliff suggests he might have learnt, Nimtz quickly bypasses an obvious avenue where he might have clarified his understanding of Lenin’s conception of the relationship between strategy and tactics in Marxist politics. This refusal to engage seriously with earlier interpretations of Lenin’s thought is particularly regrettable in this instance because Cliff’s discussion of Lenin’s comments on Clausewitz is amongst the most important attempts to conceptualise Lenin’s understanding of this relationship.​[54]​
Cliff opens this chapter by pointing out that whereas Clausewitz distinguished between tactics as “the theory of the use of military force in combat” and strategy as “the theory of the use of combat for the object of war”, Lenin extended this distinction to the class struggle so that for him “the concept of tactics applies to measures that serve a single task or a single branch of the class struggle”, while the concept of strategy refers to “a combination of tactics that, by their association and growth, lead to the working-class conquest of power”.​[55]​ 
These two concepts are related in Lenin’s Marxism through the dialectical unity of means and ends in the revolutionary process.​[56]​ According to Lenin, “only by constantly having the ‘ultimate aim’ in view, only by appraising every step of the ‘movement’ and every reform from the point of view of the general revolutionary struggle, is it possible to guard the movement against false steps and shameful mistakes”.​[57]​ This approach, which clearly builds on Engels’s critique of opportunism noted above, notoriously contrasts with Bernstein’s reduction of socialist politics to the day-to-day tactics of the SPD. And whereas Lenin’s method created a space from which to criticise any specific tactic from the strategic perspective of what Lukács’s called the “actuality of the revolution”,​[58]​ Bernstein’s claim that “the movement was everything to me ... the final goal of socialism nothing” famously informed his justification of opportunism through an explicitly reformist rejection of revolutionary politics.​[59]​ 
Whether participation in parliamentary-type elections is best understood as a strategy or a tactic within Lenin’s conception of politics is important because whereas the former would place it at the centre of the struggle for socialism, the latter implies a much more subordinate position within that struggle. As it happens Lenin was quite clear that electoral participation was of secondary significance to other forms of mass working-class action within a broader revolutionary strategy. So, while in Left-Wing Communism an Infantile Disorder he maintained that the “Bolsheviks participated in the most counterrevolutionary parliaments, and experience has shown that this participation was not only useful but indispensable to the party of the revolutionary proletariat”, he nonetheless contended that “action by the masses, a big strike, for instance, is more important than parliamentary activity at all times”.​[60]​ Interestingly, while Nimtz quotes the first of these sentences twice in his book, and though he describes Left-Wing Communism as “Lenin’s final and definitive treatment of the topic” of parliamentary participation, he does not mention the fundamental caveat contained in the second of these sentences.​[61]​
This omission in his reconstruction of Lenin’s politics suggests that we should be careful about too easily accepting Nimtz’s claim that Lenin’s electoral work was strategic in nature. For Nimtz tends to “bend the stick” almost to breaking point in the direction of Lenin’s argument for participation in parliamentary elections whilst downplaying the caveats Lenin places on electoral work. This is not to say that Nimtz does not mention these caveats when he describes Lenin’s thinking at particular junctures, it is rather that he doesn’t integrate these caveats into the lessons he draws from his broader reconstruction of Lenin’s approach to electoral work. 
That said, once we accept that the Bolshevik electoral work was of secondary importance to other forms of mass action we can register that Nimtz has done the left a service by providing ample evidence that revolutionary theory (at least in its “Leninist” variant) should not be counterposed to serious and sustained parliamentary work: Lenin did not embrace a form of “anti-parliamentary cretinism” that Miliband has suggested Leninist parties tended towards.​[62]​ Indeed he would have agreed with Miliband that, in modern Western democracies, “a strategy of advance has to include a real measure of electoral support”.​[63]​ Where Lenin differed from reformist socialists was not in his advocacy of parliamentary participation, but rather in his insistence that parliamentary struggle should be subordinate to broader struggles beyond parliament. This is why it was wrong of Miliband to reify Leninism as the “insurrectionary” other to reformist “constitutionalism”.​[64]​ Though Lenin was no constitutionalist, as Miliband was aware he certainly didn’t dismiss constitutional forms of struggle. Rather, he insisted that these struggles should remain a subordinate part of a broader revolutionary, not merely insurrectionary, politics – and by confusing Lenin’s politics with their reification, especially during the Comintern’s Third Period, Miliband is too quick to dismiss Lenin’s relevance in ”countries of advanced capitalism”.​[65]​ 
Despite his failure to clarify the difference between strategy and tactics in Lenin’s politics, Nimtz does make a strong case not only that Lenin’s revolutionary strategy involved important electoral work, but also that his approach to elections illuminates a concrete divergence between his politics and Kautsky’s Marxism prior to 1914. If this is in many ways an old story - Carl Schorske, for example, detailed how, by contrast with Bolshevism, German Social Democracy increasingly came to subordinate extra-parliamentary activities to the struggle in parliament in a way that eventually paralysed the socialist movement​[66]​ - it is a point that nevertheless deserves repeating. According to Nimtz “the historic split in international Marxism between communism and social democracy” did not merely have deep roots in their different forms of practice before 1914, but “was long in place before the Guns of August 1914 exploded owing in large part to two very different conceptions of how Marxists should comport themselves in the electoral/parliamentary arenas”.​[67]​ 
Though this argument has the merit, contra Lih, of recognising that Lenin was doing something qualitatively different to Kautsky before 1914, Nimtz is a little too reticent about admitting that Lenin failed to recognise this difference until after the outbreak of war. For though he admits both that “whether Lenin fully appreciated the significance of the difference is admittedly uncertain” and that the schism was only evident “in hindsight”, one gets the impression that Nimtz has been overtaken in his polemical zeal to correct Lih’s erroneous claim that Lenin was an “aggressively unoriginal” Kautskyan (“Erfurtian”) up to and after 1914.​[68]​ For instance, in the article Nimtz cites as evidence of “the end of [Lenin’s] patience” with Kautsky prior to 1914 – a piece in Pravda from December 1913 entitled Kautsky’s Unpardonable Error – Lenin actually explained Kautsky’s “mistake” about the Russian party being “dead” not as a consequence of a fundamental flaw with his Marxism but as a “result of liquidator efforts abroad”.​[69]​ Lenin suggested it was because Kautsky had been given bad advice from right-wing elements within the Russian socialist movement not because his Marxism had become fundamentally distorted in a reformist direction that he erred in his assessment of the situation in Russia. 
This essay does not so much mark the “end of Lenin’s patience” with Kautsky as it evidences ongoing practical differences between the two men that were very real but had yet to cause a fundamental break between them. For whereas Lenin considered his differences with Bernstein to be strategic in nature, up until 1914 he conceived his differences with Kautsky and the dominant tendency with German social democracy to be merely tactical in kind.​[70]​ So, as late as August 1913, Lenin justified his own approach to parliamentary work in terms taken directly from German Social Democracy. Thus, in an obituary of August Bebel, Lenin wrote that “[t]he fundamentals of parliamentary tactics for German (and international) Social Democracy, tactics that never yield an inch to the enemy, never miss the slightest opportunity to achieve even small improvements for the workers and are at the same time implacable on questions of principle and always directed to the accomplishment of the final aim – the fundamentals of these tactics were elaborated by Bebel himself or under his direct leadership and with his participation”.​[71]​ In truth, as the events of 1914 revealed, the Germans had allowed the tactic of parliamentary participation to overwhelm their increasingly nominal revolutionary rhetoric. ​[72]​
By contrast with the SPD, Lenin’s subordination of Bolshevik electoral participation to the broader movement was intended to mediate against the “parliamentary disease” of opportunism.​[73]​ His aim was to engage at all levels (including the parliamentary) in “the real movement which abolishes the present state of things”​[74]​ without forgetting that the “ultimate aim” of political action was revolution. So while he didn’t dismiss participation in parliamentary elections, he did insist, in the words of the Comintern’s “Thesis on Communist Parties and Parliamentarianism”, that “Communist members of parliament must subordinate all of their parliamentary activities to the party’s work outside of parliament”.​[75]​ Plainly, this formulation marks a clear break with social democratic electoral practice but not with the idea of working within parliaments.
However, Lenin’s approach to parliamentary work also tacitly assumes that the movement beyond parliament is essentially revolutionary. Indeed, it is a relatively easy thing not to lose sight of the ultimate revolutionary aim of a social movement if the real movement from below does actually tends to “abolish the present state of things”. Unfortunately, the real movement in Germany at the turn of the twentieth-century tended, of course, towards reformism. In this context, Lenin’s explanation of Kautsky’s rapprochement with Bernstein’s revisionism in terms of his break with Marx’s theory of the state is one-sided.​[76]​ It is also significant that Kautsky’s organic reformism reflected and justified the day-to-day reformist practice of the workers’ movement of this period.​[77]​
This fact points to an important weakness with Nimtz’s claims about the general significance of Marx’s critique of opportunism in the 1879 Circular Letter. This letter does not begin to address the problem of working-class reformism as a structural characteristic of capitalist social relations. And though Marx and Engels penned ad hoc and descriptive criticisms of opportunism, they never developed these insights into a coherent theory of reformism adequate to the modern world.​[78]​ By suggesting that the twenty-first century left should follow their approach to building an independent revolutionary working-class party without exploring the difficulties posed for such a project by the widespread, deep and institutionalised working-class reformism that qualitatively increased in importance after their deaths, Nimtz fails to map how such a party might avoid becoming a sect. More to the point, this is a problem that Lenin never adequately answered: for, like Marx, he “did not appreciate the strength of the hold of reformism over the labour movement”.​[79]​ 
But without an adequate theory of reformism any call to build an independent working-class party reads like the ABC of Marxist politics with the B and C left out. To move beyond this limited perspective requires synthesising the call for an independent working-class party with something like Rosa Luxemburg’s account both of the organic nature of working-class reformism, especially as it tends to be fixed within the workers’ movement by the labour bureaucracy, and the tension between this type of reformism and the kind of movements for reforms within the system that tend, when they progress beyond a certain scale, to open a space for revolutionary struggles against it.​[80]​ This dynamic model of the workers’ movement suggests that any party hoping to intervene in the “real movement” from below will of necessity have to engage with and work alongside reformist parties and movements in a way that is much more nuanced than the approach suggested by Nimtz in his book’s rather sectarian and propagandistic conclusions about contemporary electoral work.​[81]​ 
Contra Nimtz, revolutionary electoral work should not be a matter merely of standing in elections with the correct programme. Rather, it is essential to make concrete tactical judgements about how electoral participation should be entered into, how it should relate to other political priorities, and how best, through alliances and such like, it should help maintain a revolutionary voice within the real movement from below. These considerations can adequately be addressed only on the basis of a clear distinction between socialist strategy and tactics and the position of elections therein.  
Though Nimtz fails to do this, his book is a rich source of details that complement the analysis of the relationship between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary work outlined in Lenin’s Left-wing Communism an Infantile Disorder. Lenin’s Electoral Strategy should thus be read alongside Lars Lih’s Lenin Rediscovered as a contribution to overturning caricatured interpretations of Lenin’s legacy through a detailed reconstruction of what he actually said and did. After reading Lenin’s Electoral Strategy one can be in no doubt that Lenin took elections – to the various Dumas, to the Constituent Assembly, and to the Soviets - extremely seriously. 
However, and again this is reminiscent of Lih’s book, Nimtz tends to over-egg his pudding: by “bending the stick” too far in an understandable attempt to emphasise Lenin’s electoral participation against caricatures of his practice he risks reifying this tactic by, for instance, his overblown claim that Lenin’s “electoral/parliamentary strategy was decisive in the Bolshevik-led triumph in 1917”. One can agree with Rabinowitch that this claim is implausible without denying the importance of Bolshevik electoral activity as part of Lenin’s broader revolutionary strategy. 
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